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tion, has been m assive w estw ard m igrations , m ainly from Asia. Thus began the pred om inance of nomadic existenc e in Anatolia around the 10th century. The ® rst m igration after the establish ment of nomadism in A natolia, w hich brought w ith it a`trib al' form of organization to the penin sula to an extent w hich has never been experienced before w as the 13th-century Tartar/M ogul in¯ux. The second major in¯ux of nomadic peoples came about the tim e that the O sm anlõ Beylik (prin cipality or emirate) w as expanding at the expense of the Turkm en Beyliks in A natolia. Later, w ith the emerg en ce of the Sa fevi political in¯uence in Iran in the 14th century, m igrations turn ed back tow ard s the east (D em irtas Ë , 1949, p. 38; Su È m er, 1980, p. 156) , and rem ained so until the arrival of Tamerlane (or Tim ur the lam e) at the turn of the 15th century, w hich brough t another major w ave of nom adic immigrants to A natolia. This mass m ove of the (trib ally organized) nomadic people under Tam erlane once more successfully revived nomadism , especially in the eastern half of Anatolia.
In a sens e, the found ing of the Iranian Safev i state in the early 16th cen tury, w hose roots are to be found in the su® sect of the 14th century, w as parallel to that of the O sm anlõ in the w est. H ow ever, w hile the former rem ained much more loyal to the Turkm en w ho had found ed it, and w ho had borne the main burd en of its establish ment (Su È m er, 1976) , the latter rather sw iftly changed its policy tow ard s nomads once it w as stron g en ough to do so.
O ttom an Policies of C on tainm ent and Settlem ent
The subordination of Anatolian nomadism greatly accelerated in the 17th century.
2 From the view point of the Empire, the m ost critical factor in the 17th century w as its in ability to m aintain its borders as a result of several defeats in the w est. The Em pire had already und ergon e a seriou s declin e in its agricultural population at the en d of the Great Escape in the ® rst half of the century. It came face to face w ith a drastic fall in production and hen ce suffered famine in most regions of Anatolia (A kd ag Ï , 1975, p. 61ff.) . Furtherm ore, ª the C elali rebellio ns of the later sixteen th century ¼ made it increasin gly dif® cult to guarantee the safety of m erch ants and their goodsº (Faroqhi, 1982, p. 523) . The result w as a one-third declin e in tax reven ue in many regions. To solve this double-ed ged problem (i.e. military and ® nancial) the central governmen t applied military force. On the one hand , it attempted to keep rural people w here they w ere and to sen d those w ho had emigrated to the cities back to the countrysid e. On the other hand, it tried to extract the same total am ount of tax from those w ho did not leave their villages, all the w hile trying to impose additional taxes upon them to ® nance the costly m ilitary expeditions. 3 These practices only w orsen ed cond itions in the country sid e. The administra tion even tually relinq uish ed this policy, and tried to resettle the vast areas left idle eith er by sen ding the rural population back to their homes or through attempts to repopulate them w ith nomads and immigrants from the lost provinces.
A fresh effort at reform ing the military began at about the sam e tim e. The devshirm e sys tem of the yenic Ë eris w as now far from ef® cient. The yenic Ë eris w ere undisciplin ed and w eak. Thus began the recruitment of the yo È ru È ks in the Balkans . H ow ever, a great majority of the yo È ru È ks in the Balkans w ere long settled (i.e. oturak) and did not view active military service as an en ticing prospect. To brin g the people to the calling , the governm en t granted them the honorary title: Evla Ã d-õ Fa Ã tiha Ã n, i.e. Sons of the Conquerors. Second, it exempted them from all the taxes they had previously been forced to pay as reaya (Go È kbilgin, 1957, pp. 255± 256) . The establishm en t of the Evla Ã d-õ Fa Ã tiha Ã n troops in 1691 posed new problem s for the state. Though the Balkan yo È ru È ks w ere not en thusiastic about this project and w ere pressed in to serv ice only by these ideological and econom ic m easures, many people from the Anatolian countrysid e tried to join these troops by claiming that they too w ere yo È ru È ks. O thers took a more negative attitude and rebelled , or seized this occasion as an opportunity for resistin g any taxation w hatsoever (C Ë etintu È rk, 1943, p. 116) .
W hile the Governm en t w as organizing the long -settled nom ads as Evla Ã d-õ Fa Ã tiha Ã n in the Balkans, it initiated a com prehensive settlem ent project in eastern parts of Anatolia and Syria in 1691. The south-eastern extrem es of A natolia w ere under continuous assault by the Bedouins (or the Badaw i, i.e. the desert nomads) from the south (Orhon lu, 1987, pp. 45± 46) . H ere the frontiers w ere rein forced agains t the Sa fevõÃ and the social disord er caused on the arable land s of Anatolia by the Bed ouins. The areas chosen for (re)settlem en t w ere Raqqa, H am a, H umus and Aleppo in Syria, and the area coverin g mainly the w est betw een the Adana and Tokat provin ces in Anatolia (ibid., 1987, pp. 32, 55± 87; see also Bates, 1971a ). W herea s the main concern in establishin g the Evla Ã d-õ Fa Ã tiha Ã n w as military, the settlem ent of Anatolia and Syria inv olved social and economic dimen sion s as w ell as establishin g order on the eastern and south-eastern soil (Orh onlu, 1987, pp. 37± 45, 56) . Furtherm ore, those nomads settled in A natolia and Syria w ere consid ered among the causes of the socioeconomic instability of A natolia by the administration (Uluc Ë ay, 1955, pp. 80± 85) .
Settlem en t of nomadic ashirets in earlier centuries in the Balkans and elsew here w as part of the colonization of new ly conquered lands. The new project in dicated an ª introversio n of settlem en t policyº (Orh onlu, 1987, p. 96) in that it attem pted to repopulate the heart of the Empire. In other w ords, the O sm anlõ w ere now trying to maintain control of the m ainland w here their pow er rested for so many centuries. Although the choice of both Anatolia and Syria in volved sim ilar concern s, an additional military role w as assigned to the settlers along trade routes and /or borders, w ho thus receiv ed some extra righ ts. W hile the form er settlers in the Balkans and elsew here w ere regard ed sim ply as reaya, i.e. commoners, in socioeconomic term s 4 and w ere taxed according ly (ib id., 1987, p. 71ff.) , the latter w ere exem pted from several taxes (ibid., 1987, p. 47) , thereby becom ing the askerõÃ , i.e. military. Those assign ed as militia to guard the derbents (mountain passes) w ere also allow ed to en gage in pastoral production as long as they did not change locations seasonally . In order to guard the trade routes and to stand as perm anent frontier forces, they had to stay on the spot all year round (1987, p. 47) . They could pursue their`traditional mode of life' only by send ing their herd s to the highland s w ith their shep herds in sum mer (ibid., 1987, p. 51) . Q uite realistically, the govern ment did not expect to prevent comm unal seasonal m ovem en ts by law alone, and secured them by force (ib id., 1987, p. 51 ; see also Bates, 1971b).
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The comm on practice of the O sm anlõ w as to settle nomadic`tribes' in fragm en ts aw ay from each other in order to prev en t any rapid recovery of their prev ious pow er or unsupervised movem en t (Orh onlu, 1987, p. 56 ). This tim e, how ever, they w ere settled along the borders or trade routes in large groups so as to facilitate the perform ance of their m ilitary duty, to protect those borders and trade routes (A sw ad, 1971 ). Since such ashiret settlem en ts migh t w ell start causing trouble them selves, the govern ment took severa l measures to preserv e the stability of the settlem en ts and their loyalty. The chiefs and other notables, i.e. bey s and kethu È das, w ho had high stand ing both w ithin their com munities and in the ey es of the state, w ere given the largest and best land s. The chiefs' w illin gn ess to settle w as instru mental in brin ging them consid erab le land titles as w ell (Orh onlu, 1987, p. 57) .
The 1691± 96 settlem en t project w as a multid imens ional one. To the O sm anlõ , rural settlem en t w as the only w ay to counter the prob lem s of decreasing rural population, crop damage caused by irregu lar nomadism , and extern al threat. Banditry and raids on dw ellin g areas w ere largely ascribed to the nomadsÐ usually , quite righ tly so (see Bayrak, 1984) . In many cases, the disruptive groups w ere reported to have come from eastern A natolia and Syria, w here they had earlier been forced to settle. 6 Large numbers of C rim ean and C aucasian agricultural imm igrants w ere settled next to the nom adic ash irets, if not directly on the pastures used by them . Thus, in these border areas and trade-route passages vacated by the people durin g the upheavals leading to the Great Escape, not only w as security expected to be maintained but also a very critical balance w as intended betw een the experienc ed cultivators and nomadic settlers. The incom ing people had recen tly lost their ancestral land s, and w ere determ ined not to ex perience the sam e fate again. They represente d a stron g and intransigen t foe for the nom ads , w ho w ere not pleased at having been red uced to immobility. W hat is more, the tw o could successfully stand togeth er against the advance of a common enem y, such as the Sh am m ar and A neze Bedouins of A rabia (Orhon lu, 1987, pp. 45± 46) . The pres en ce of nom ads as`tribal' settlers w as also seen as a factor that w ould control local`feudalistic tend encies' , 7 w hich had already emerg ed in the 17th century (U luc Ë ay, 1955, pp. 71± 74). It w as not easy to prev en t nomads from abandoning their assign ed plots (Orhonlu, 1987, pp. 81ff, 88ff.) . The land and its natural resources w ere often claimed by nom ads to be insuf® cient. Furtherm ore, as settlers, they w ere subject to recurren t attacks of stron ger or Bed ouin groups from the south (ibid., 1987, p. 90) . Finally, new taxes w ere imposed on them and w ere regu larly extracted after they became`sedentary,' i.e. im mobile. So, many of them left their settlem en t zones to avoid strict political control and taxation, and¯ed into areas w here they could more readily cope w ith the pres sures imposed by the governors.
This time their¯igh t w as not exclusively tow ard the w est or north . A principal altern ative w as the east. Iran had been a preferred destin ation for many nomads sin ce the 16th century, and it continued to be so durin g the 17th and 18th centuries (Demirtas Ë , 1949, p. 38; Su È mer, 1980, pp. 303± 304) . The extent of the eastw ard migration and hence its impact on the O sm anlõ in A natolia w as quite substantial. For example, on one occasion in the 18th century , 50 000 nomads left their lands around the Taurus m ountains, and w en t to Iran (Yalm an, 1977, I, pp. 49, 102; Su È mer, 1980, pp. 303± 304) .
As a result, initial attem pts at repopulating the Anatolian country sid e and in creasing agricultural productivity largely failed , despite some temporary successes (Orhon lu, 1987) . N or w ere the issues of safer trade, transportation and the like completely solved . other concern s. ª This policy inv olved the construction and repair of forti® ed kervansarays and the reorga nization of the corps of passg uard s (derbend ci)º (Faroqh i, 1982, p. 523 ).
This time, many of the reasons people gave for¯eein g or resis ting settlem en t on assigned plots beg an to be given m ore seriou s consid eration (H alac Ë og Ï lu, 1988) . The declared aim w as still to populate and cultivate the devastated countrysid e, by brin gin g security and stability back to Anatolia. H ow ever, the O sm anlõ w ere O sm anlõ and acted like O sm anlõ more often than not. Thus, special forces lik e Fõ rka-õ Isla Ã hiye w ere sen t against resistin g nom ads , and there w ere m any armed clash es. Due to som e talented, able govern ors, some successes w ere achieved at least temporarily in certain reg ions in A natolia (ibid.) and Syria (Lew is, 1987) .
In the meantime, reform ation of m ilitary organization continued at full speed . O ne of these attem pts w as the establish ment of the N iza Ã m -õ CedõÃ d (literally, the N ew O rd er) arm y in 1793. The resista nce of the long corrupted yenic Ë eris w as so ® erce and stron g that the attem pt could not go further than trying to main tain the new reg im en ts as special guard s, dow nplaying their role and keep ing both their numbers and public appearances very low .
In addition to the establis hm en t of a new central army, the state also tried to rein force and stren gth en the old frontiers, as w ell as establish new ones. ª The ® nal steps ¼ to extend central control into the provinces involved a major reorg anization of the arm yº in 1841, w hich w as for ª the ® rst time divid ed into provincial commandsº in an attempt to counter and term inate the local ª govern ors' control of the m ilitary forces w ithin their domainsº (Shaw & Shaw , 1978, p. 85) . In addition to these forces, the ª irregu lar tribesmen , gen erally called bashõ bozuk s,º assisted the provin cial division s ª w ith som e 65 000 w arriorsº (ib id., p. 86).
The Balkan troops of ex-nomads founded in 1691, Evla Ã d-õ Fa Ã tiha Ã n, w ere reorg anized in 1832 (w ith the same exem ptions and priv ileg es), and w ere deployed not only in the w est but also in Georgia, for instance (Go È kbilg in, 1957, p. 256) . O w ing to the desperate need for their services, the priv ileg ed status of the Evla Ã d-õ Fa Ã tiha Ã n continued until 1850 w hen the Tanzim at, i.e. Reform ation, govern ment of 1839 ann ounced military service to be a duty of all citizen s (ib id., p. 256). A new Land Act follow ed this law in 1858, w hich: ¼ in combination w ith follow ing num erous decrees of execution, led to a stabilization of law and order in the country, especially regard ing the m ost im portant security of property. Property of landÐ till then only possible as m õ Ã rõ Ã , a form of copyh oldÐ could now be changed into a leg al title of ow ners hip. (H u È tteroth , 1973, p. 23) 8 W hile this law stim ulated the expansion of agricultural production via the leg alization of the cultivation of additional land s such as pastures, w hich probably had alread y beg un, it did the opposite to nomadism. In addition to the decrease of pastures available for grazing, many dw ellin g-places (left idle by villagers), presumably used by nom ads on a seasonal basis , w ere now being revived by the settlem en t of ª hundred s of thousand s of M uslim s ¼ emigrated from the C rim ea, Caucasus, and the Balkansº follow ing their loss (ibid., p. 23).
These developm en ts, combined w ith the continuing attem pts of the governm en t to control them as sed en taries, 9 put the nom adic confederations in a very constrained situation. A s a result, some volunteered for settlem en t (see Yalman, 1977, I; pp. 215, 216) . M any refused to oblige and moved further east w hile others w ere alread y continuing to en joy a relative`freedom' in quite larg e confed erations. Others join ed nomadic groups after leaving the lands on w hich they w ere settled by of® cial decrees (ibid., 1977, I, p. 251) . Some ashirets resorted to banditry because of the dif® culties of adjusting to a settled life (see Boran, 1945, pp. 31± 32) . H ow ever, the O sm anlõ do not seem to have follow ed a policy of settlin g all nomads. A s Bates sees it, it w as ª a project w hich arose from the govern ment' s desire to brin g politically threatenin g tribes under controlº (1973a, p. 225).
10 To achieve this goal, it seem ed the best and easiest w ay for the state to grant land titles to the chie¯y ® gures of every tribal group. This thereb y initiated ª the rise of larg e private estatesº in south-east Anatolia (Asw ad, 1971, p. 21; cf. Bes Ë ikc Ë i, 1969b) w here ª many of their descendants are found am ong the largest landlord s of the region todayº (Bates, 1973a, p. 225 ).
As noted above, local notables w ere already emerg ing throughout Anatolia as feudalis tic' derebeys, w ith almost-absolute pow ers over the reaya. The policy of giving arable lands to notables as priv ate hold ing s, in addition to the collective or comm unal lands gran ted to the settlin g confederations, in time led to an enlargem en t of the estates and , hence, the expansion of the pow er of the notables at the expens e of the m asses (cf. Sen cer, 1974) . N otables acquired lands through a variety of means , from illega l coercion and appropriation to legal transfer. Also partly because of nomads' inability and unw illin gn ess to stay and en gage in cultivation on the assig ned plots, in the end all the land turned into the priv ate property of these ashiret notables, w ho now became local (land)lords w hile the ordinary nom ads gradually became dispossess ed tenants. After gettin g rid of the large and m ore threatenin g confederations, the govern men t allow ed the others w ho ª offered no threat to the political stability of the reg ionº , to continue their usual w ay of life (Bates, 1973b, p. 34 ).
R evival of N om adism in Eastern A natolia: The Hamidiye C ava lries
In the last quarter of the 19th century, further even ts occurred that accelerated the rev ival of nom adism (and , thereby, the ashiret structure) in eastern Anatolia. In direct cooperation w ith the Russian s, w ho w ere continuing their advances through C aucasia in the north -east (w hich is on a major trade route betw een C aucasus, Iran and A natolia), the O sm anlõ A rm en ians initiated guerilla activity beh ind the arm y lines so as to help the Russians defeat the O sm anlõ . The British w ere another concern . The British had already`rented ' the province of C yprus unilaterally in 1878 (Kodam an, 1987, p. 25) , and ann exed Egypt in 1882 (ib id., p. 68), all und er the pretex t of prev en ting the Russians from doing so. H ence, they w ere righ tly suspected of having furth er am bitions concernin g O sm anlõ land s, extend ing from north-east Anatolia to the Arabian pen insu la.
These developmen ts led the central govern ment to adopt a rather traditional strategy. In 1891, the state organized 36 regim ents (Fõ rat, 1983, p. 123) , from among the ashiret (i.e. nomadic and sem i-nomadic) w arriors of eastern Anatolia (Kodaman, 1987, pp. 44, 49) . 11 Tw o important criteria for selection w ere the size and pow er of the groups. Large and strong confederations that could rise against the state in a con¯ict w ere not the ® rst choice. Adherence to sunnõ Ã Islam w as preferred , though not steadfastly follow ed (see Kodam an, 1987, p. 37 ). The purposes w ere varied, three of w hich w ere: ª to help the arm y suppress terrorism in the eastº (Shaw & Shaw , 1978, p. 203 ), ª to counter the Russian C ossack forces in the C rim ea, and also to control the tribes them selv es bỳ placing' nomadic areas adjacen t to the Russian borderº (ibid., p. 246; cf. Bes Ë ikc Ë i, 1969a, p. 79 (Shaw & Shaw , 1978; p. 206 ). Their arm s w ere provided by the state and although they ª w ere supposed to be provid ed only w hen they w ere en gaged in combat ¼ in fact m ost of them m anaged to keepº them even after the w ar (ibid., p. 206). These regim en ts w ere not totally free from governm en t control. Although they w ere actually ª comm anded by the trib al chiefs ¼ reg ular army of® cers also w ent along to train the men and make sure that the overall com mand s w ere carried outº (ib id., p. 206).
These regim en ts provided the means for nom ads to foster their priv ileg ed position in the region and , consequen tly, the ª H amidiye tribal force grew fairly rapidly, to 40 regim en ts in 1892, 56 in 1893, and 63 in 1899º (Shaw & Shaw , 1978, p. 206) . One reason w as the regu lation en acted for their recruitment, w hich stated that the people had tw o choices: eith er to be recruited for regu lar arm y service; or to becom e irregu lars und er the H am id iye troops (Kodaman, 1987, p. 37 ). This expansion w as realized also through force exercis ed by the H am idiye chiefs (see Fõ rat, 1983, pp. 125± 126) as w ell as through the independ ent initiative of other chiefs, w ho had initially been hesitant or even unw illing to be recruited .
The appeal of these regim ents can also be located in their organization and its effects (Fõ rat, 1983, pp. 124± 126) . In fact, this seem s to be the main reason w hy the chiefs w ho at ® rst hesitated to join the reg im en ts and w ere thus left out of the H am idiye organization later becam e eager supporters of it. They realized that the early founders of the regim en ts soon becam e stronger and m ore resp ected than they could have ever dream ed had they not joined these forces. M any chiefs im mediately became com mand ers of a combination of several sm all kabiles or ashirets in addition to their ow n kabile or ashirets, thereb y becom ing leading ® gures in the region .
One consequence of the establishm en t of the H am idiye reg im en ts w as the division of the people into tw o antagonistic groups. Those w ho w ere servin g in these regim ents became ª the H am idiyeº vis-a Á -vis the others. For more than tw o decades, the prev ious names and titles of the people involved in the H amidiye organization w ere subsum ed under the m ore com prehensive and legally authoritative rubric H am idiye. Since relig ious af® liation (sun nõ Ã vs. alevõÃ ) w as another concern of the O sm anlõ in appointing the increasing ly w illin g cand idate w arriors as H am idiye, sectarian antagonism 13 resurfaced and rose to an unforeseen magn itude betw een the tw o groups, adding greatly the strains felt betw een them later (see Fõ rat, 1983, p. 158ff.) .
14 On the death of Sultan H amid in 1909, the H am idiye chiefs found them selv es in a dang erous vacuum. The new governm en t did not seem to sh are the policy of the deceased Sultan. A s opposed to the sunn õ Ã -orien ted Islamicist policy of A bdu È l H amid, the new govern ment adopted an Ottomanist view to (re)unite the badly divided population of the Empire, C hris tians, Jew s and M uslim s alike (C Ë avdar, 1984). This policy found immediate support among the non-H amidiye alevõÃ com munities in eastern A natolia, w ho had suffered most severely from the divisive consequences of the earlier policy (Fõ rat, 1983, p. 141ff.) . Partly because of bein g left pow erles s by the death of the Sultan, w hom they consid ered a father (ibid., p. 125), and partly because of the threat posed by the alliance betw een the new govern men t and the alevõÃ ashirets, som e of the commanderchiefs rebelled im mediately after the announcem en t of the era of the Second C onstitution (M es Ë ru Ã tiyet) in 1908, but w ere subseq uently defeated by regu lar troops. 15 Only after these defeats and under strict govern men tal control did these irreg ular nomadic reg im en ts give up ® gh ting the new regim e. The M es Ë ru Ã tiy et govern ment did not dissolve the regim en ts but chose to control them more directly. N ow , each reg im en t had a reg ular m ajor as its second-incommand (Fõ rat, 1983, pp. 141± 142) . Again, according to the law , raiding and tax-gatherin g w ere no longer perm itted (ibid., p. 142). Despite these restrictions, the chiefs did not lose their pow er and authority eith er among the troops or among the sed en taries of the region (ibid., pp. 141± 142). They still proved helpful to the govern ment in w ar. In 1912, they w ere put on alert because of the Balkan con¯ict in the w est. The continuing threat of the Russian Empire forced the govern men t to maintain and train H am idiye regim en ts in the east. At the begin nin g of the First W orld W ar in 1914, the H am idiyes w ere sent against the Russians. Though they fough t to the best of their abilities , they w ere defeated. M ost of them¯ed back into the mountains w here they began to en gage in banditry and raidin g.
Those w ho stayed at the front w ere reorg anized and gathered into tw o divisions, w hich survived until about 1920 (Fõ rat, 1983, pp. 143± 444). They adamantly resis ted dissolution, and rem nants of them (even after their of® cial disbanding) caused the O sm anlõ governm en t many headaches. A sid e from trying to exact illega l taxes from villagers and non -H am idiy e ashirets, they en gaged in ® erce ® gh ts w ith one another. Besid es such inter-ashiret w arfare, the ex-comm anders turn ed into local`despots' kn ow n as the derebeys of absolute pow er, w ith hund reds of arm ed men at their command. These even ts created w idespread unrest in the region . But the O sm anlõ found them selv es on the losing side durin g the closin g stages of the First W orld W ar, and w ere in no position to put a stop to such illega l activities any w here in the country. I Ç stanbul w as under allied in vasion. In the east, nomads and the ashiret system w ere once again on the ris e, and in the m idst of the chaos created by the pow er gap at the centre from losing the w ar, raids and band itry became taken for granted as daily even ts (ib id., pp. 155± 156).
T he Present C ond itions of N om adism in T urke y
U nd er the new reg im e, the privileged nom adic groups and their leaders had to relin quish their leg al/of® cial titles, administra tive and military rig hts and duties , such as collecting taxes (Fõ rat, 1983, p. 141ff.) . A second developm en t w as the closure of the eastern and south-eastern borders in the late 1920s and the 1930s, w hich curbed the migratory orbit of nomads drastically, and red uced the area that they could exploit. Furtherm ore, some of the disb anded ex-H am idiy e ashirets w ere left outside Turk ey . Later on, the en actmen t of the Village Act in 1924 turned the pow er relations betw een nomads and villagers com pletely upsid e dow n. This Act w as design ed to protect the interests of villagers against in truders such as nomads and converted the traditional grazing plots, highland s and pastures that nomads had been using into the com mon property of (the neares t) villages (Tu È tengil, 1969, p. 128) . D epen ding on their ow n productive orien tation, the villagers chose eith er to exploit the pastures themselves, or to rent them to nom ads (w ho w ere now stripped of this basic economic means) at high rates. Since, how ever, many of these villagers w ere ex-nomads settled earlier, they too retained an ashiret structure sim ilar to that of the nomads, if not exactly the sam e. M ore precisely , the con¯ict w as now also one among ashirets.
C onsequen t upon the process sk etched above, contemporary nomadism is strictly dom inated by the sed entary w ay of life into w hich it becom es more in corporated every day. In contrast w ith the political pow er they held in the past, w hich lasted until the 1930s, pastoral nomadic ashirets today are subordinate to the agricultural population. The presen t reg im e is organized on the basis of a settled w ay of life. H ence, nomads, w ho are a priori consid ered as ª the people of no land º , do not stand a chance agains t villagers w hen con¯icts occur, unless they are eith er backed or represen ted by an able perso n in the region . The of® cial de-recognition of (nomadic) ashirets as legal communities by the foundation of the Republic in 1923 und erm ined the leadersh ip and made the allegia nce of their m embers to certain ashiret leaders contrary to the ideology of central govern ment. In most disputes betw een villagers and nomads, therefore, the law , and hen ce security forces, are on the sid e of the villagers unless, to repeat, they are alig ned w ith local pow er foci.
As a result of the developments and policies describ ed earlier, eastern and south-eastern A natolia became a refuge for nom ads. A sim ple observation in the Republic of Turkey reveals that there is a ª clearcut contrastº (de Planh ol, 1959, p. 529) betw een w estern Anatolia and eastern Anatolia in term s of nomadic, i.e. ashiret, survival. Until about tw o decades ago or so, nomadism w as quite vestigia l in the w est, and practised mainly betw een the coastal plains and the plateaux near Kayseri (in central A natolia) by several fragm en ted grouping s of the A yd õ nlõ group (Eberh ard , 1967, p. 282) and by the rem nants of Bozolog Ï , i.e. (Yalman, 1977, Vol. II) . In eastern Anatolia, on the other hand, nomadism experienced ª a m uch m ore vigorous survivalº (de Planhol, 1959, p. 529 ) until quite recently. If one reason w hy nomadic survival w as much more vigorous in the east is the suitable clim ate and geogra phy, another factor w hich resulted in the prev alence of nomadism in the east has been the differential rate of agricultural m echanization and comm ercialization (Erh an, 1992, p. 88) in Turkey. Furth erm ore, as a result of the developmen ts and policies described earlier, eastern and south-eastern soil had become a refuge for nom adic ashirets until about a couple of decades ago. Studies sh ow that even in the 1980s there w ere som e pastoral nomadic ashirets in eastern Anatolia such as the S Ë avaklõ of the Elazõ g Ï -Tunceli-Erzincan range w hich had as many as 15 000 mem bers (Ayd õ n, 1980, p. 143; Kutlu, 1987, p. 53) . O ne should add the Beritanlõ ashiret to this list, the number of w hose m em bers, regard less of their active involvem en t in nomadic pastoral practices, easily equalled the S Ë avaklõ , if not exceeded them (Erh an, 1992).
Boz-U lus
Indeed , one of the most distinguishin g social characteristics of the population in eastern A natolia is its as yet und etached ashiret af® liations w hich at times of in ter-group con¯ict, such as feuds, prove them selves to be a major basis of solid arity and cooperation (H akkõ , 1932; Sencer, 1992± 93, pp. 609, 614± 615) . 16 In other w ords, the prevailin g ideology w hich ultim ately governs social relations in m ost parts of the region is that of ashiret organization, i.e. genea logical kinsh ip relations; social belon gin gn ess; and the notion of ª communityº , as ª a sense of
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belong ing togeth erº Brow (1990, p. 1). 17 The same is true for the (sed entary) rural population, as w ell as m any people of the tow ns and small cities, w hich eith er have been practising a sem i-settled w ay of life or have become sed entary cultivators durin g the last tw o hund red years or so, mainly through the govern ment operations describ ed above (see also Sen cer, 1992± 93, p. 614) . At this point, it is w orth m en tionin g, in the w ords of Sen cer (1992± 93, p. 611 ) that ª It is a very rare situation to ® nd an ashiret w hich is completely nomadic or settled º .
Largely as a result of this structure, eastern (and, by the same token , southeastern ) A natolia did not seriou sly take part in the process of m echanization until the 1960s. M ost people in eastern A natolia w ere landless and organized in ashirets, and the land lord s w ould appear to have had very little to gain from using m odern m achin ery. 18 O n the one hand , m achines w ould replace larg e numbers of rural people, landless and landed alik e, w ho for the most part belong ed to the same ashiret as their landlord s. Thus, the calculation involved in adopting (or, for that matter, refusing the use of) new machinery w as not sim ply an economic one. The m achin es w ould perh aps bring about an increase in the yield . But, once the m achin es w ere introd uced, the ashiret leaders, w ho had becom e land lord s in the process of settlem en t, w ould lose their`depen dants' , i.e. the social base of their political pow er (Erhan, 1992 . In effect, then, ashiret forces w ere threatened. The introd uction of m achin ery w ould have encouraged the break-up of fund amen tal social relations in favour of capitalist penetration. N evertheless, quite aw are of their eventu al fate, the local leaders (such as the sh eikh s and ashiret chiefs) not onlyÐ and foreverÐ did res ist m echanization but also have renew ed them selv es quite successfully and adapted to m odern conditions. A s an example, they began to get actively inv olved in national party politics so as to m aintain their position and roles as local leaders and mediators (see Erh an, 1992 Erh an, , 1993 OD TU È , 1993, p. 19; Sencer, 1992± 93, pp. 614± 615) .
G A P and Its Pros pects
A t present, how ever, even the nomads of this region are contin uously losing ground at an ever increasin g speed . A t this point, Sen cer notes (1992± 93, p. 612) that the ashiret population ª w hose estim ated number w as approximately 70 000± 100 000 at the begin nin g of the 1970sº is in a process of settlem ent due to the sh ortage of sum mer and w inter quarters and the lik e. The conditions once relatively suitable for nomads in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia are now subject to drastic changes . The m ost compreh en sive and most curren t of these changes is GA P, nam ely G u È neydog Ï u A na dolu Projesi, or the Southeast Anatolian Project. GA P is an integrated m ultisectoral developm en t project coverin g the nine provinces (Adõ yaman, Batman, Diyarbakõ r, Gaziantep, Kilis, M ard in, Siirt, S Ë anlõ urfa, S Ë õ rn ak) of the south-eastern corner of Turkey. The area in question m akes up 9.7% of the country , and w ith its technical, economic and social dimens ions, the project is consid ered by severa l w estern circles as one of the three to nine w onders of the modern w orld . This develop ment project includes 13 sub-projects, the totality of w hich aim s at a hyd raulic complex able to irriga te 1 800 000 ha, so as to increase agricultural production up to 50± 60 times (Balaban, 1986, p. 5) . This ® gure is 300 000 ha more than the total irrig ated land in the w hole of Turkey at present. GA P w ere taken in 1936. H ow ever, feasib ility studies proceeded only during the 1960s and w ere ® nished by 1970. W ith regard to its magnitud e, the en tire sys tem w as projected to be completed w ithin a span of 30 years. At 1986 rates, it required a total of TL7 trillion , a sum w hich is equal to the same year' s national budget. Initially , GAP w as planned to be ® nished by the year 1990. Several reasons, in cluding the so-called ª G ulf Crisisº next door, precluded the completion of the project on time. Openin g of the Atatu È rk dam, the biggest dam of all w ithin the GA P sy stem , took place on 1 D ecember 1993. A s of A pril 1996, the sub-system s of this vast integra ted project completed so far could provid e a total of 68 000 ha of irriga tion. The energy production of the tw o dams, Karakaya and A tatu È rk , amounts to 102 630 071 000 kW h for the same year. By the en d of 1996, the total land irrig ated reached 1 693 027 ha, w hich is equal to 19% of the total economically irrig able land in Turkey .
Despite the en suing delay in the com pletion of GAP' s phys ical investm en ts, the picture looks quite dark for the nomadicÐ and, to a les ser degree, the sem i-nomadicÐ ashirets of the reg ion, w hose culture and mode of organization have pred omin ated there for m any centuries. There are very few altern atives left for them, if they could be called`alterna tive' at all. The most plausible one is to settle dow n and cease to be nomadic, thereb y practisin g some combination of cultivation and sed en tary anim al breed ing, in evitably at a m uch low er capacity.
M any nomadic groups have actually been seekin g governmen t aid to settle sin ce the 1930s. The underlying idiom of state policy has been , as it still is, to convert nomads into cultivating villagers, if not also urban dw ellers , and to m ake them productive as soon as possib le after they settle (APD, 1971) , rather than causing them to suffer the consequen ces of a prolong ed transition . Thus, the usual practice of governm en ts before 1970, under Law N o. 2510 w hich provid es the basic stipulations, w as to provid e every possible assis tance to those seek ing rural settlem en t, including land, ® eld s, housing, agricultural equipmen t and the neces sary infrastructure such as sh eds, stables and roads (Gu È lo È ksu È z, 1985, p. 307) . The prin cipal conditions of eligib ility w ere sim ple and very strictly follow ed. They w ere, as they still are, to ow n no landed property any w here in Turkey, and to be married at the tim e of the of® cial settlem en t survey.
Since the 1970s, how ever, these bene® ts are provid ed only as loans w ith easy credit term s (as low as 2.5% interes t), payable in instalmen ts over ® ve to 20 years. According to Law N o. 1306, as amend ed in 1970, ª the property is not granted for free to the settlers, but rather they become indeb ted to the state for the disbursed expensesº (Gu È lo È ksu È z, 1985, p. 307). Perh aps because the settlem en t of nom ads has not been a prim ary concern of governm en t in m odern Turkey, in practice, a group that requests settlem en t usually ® nd s a place and then noti® es govern men t agencies. If the piece of land is public property, then its current value is calculated by experts, based on an assessm ent of the quality of its cultivable land, etc., and is transferred to the group after the roads and houses have been built by the state. If the site belong s to private person s, then the governm en t purchases it from its ow ner, to turn it over to the group w hen the necessary housing, roads, drin king w ater, stores and the like have been provid ed. A t the time of settlem en t, the state also provides some initial capital, based on agreem en t w ith the group. This m ay be eith er seed grain/w heat or anim als.
N everth eless, w hat is true for`nom adism ' is not the same for`ash irets' , i.e. tribes and /or trib alism. An overw helm ing majority of sed en tary rural popu-lation in the region is organized as ashirets, thank s to the centuries-long domination of nomadism and the three-cen tury history of govern mental or voluntary settlem ent practices.
Sociological Studies in G A P
A w are of these and other issues concern ing the population of the region , w hose lives have already beg un to change or are subject to be altered drastically soon, a major concern of the GAP project is to take into consid eration the living cond itions of the people in the face of the expected and /or projected changes deriv ing from the phys ical and the en suin g econom ic changes enacted in the region. In other w ords, as distin ct from the earlier projects implem ented in Turkey (e.g. the C Ë ukurova Plain project) and elsew here in the w orld , the main objective of GA P is not merely to develop the infrastructual facilities and/or to in vest in material projects. Th e sustainability of such projects, it is w ell realized, depend s not on success in the achiev em en t of the m aterial goals alone. Rather, it depen ds on taking the human elem ent as the core factor in every single component of the project, successfully and appropriately. It is, so to speak, the human dimens ion w hich bring s eith er the failure or success of any developm en t project.
Betw een Some of the major ® nding s of these resea rch studies indicate that a de® nin g characteristic of the reg ion is its still high ly effective ashiret, i.e.`tribal' , structure and accompanyin g sociopolitical institutions . M any of the critical features and aspects of social organization and life seem to derive from this peculiar mode of organization, w hich has its roots in the O sm anlõ history, as sk etched earlier.
Besid es bein g an imperial state w ith m any and distinct relig ious and social groups w ith varyin g sociopolitical and economic activities and organizations , O sm anlõ state had develop ed certain policies on the basis of real and urgent concerns reg arding that reg ion in particular w hich is at the thres hold of the deserts to the south, as the last citadel of arable lands of Asia M inor. Beginn ing in the 1690s, the O sm anlõ w ere concerned w ith protecting the interc ontin en tal trade routes w hich passed through the reg ion, as w ell as prev en ting the desert nomads from attacking and pillagin g the arable, cultivated lands there. Therefore, they ins tituted large-scale settlem en t program mes all over the reg ion in cluding parts of pres en t Iraq and Syria. This policy of (re)settlem en t of m asses in the region continued w ith semi-success and semi-failure due to the Badaw i fear of the population settled in those agricultural zones. W hat happened in the end (as a res ult of continued efforts to settle people, the 1878 Russian ± Ottoman W ar, the Firs t W orld W ar, etc.) is the ® rm establish men t in the reg ion of tribal organization once more.
In ad dition to the lon g-establis hed (re)settlem en t policy of the O sm anlõ govern m en tÐ h istorically , th e 1854 Land A ct; the form ation of H am idiye C avalries against the Ru ssian ad vances in th e 1870s from trib al group s, und er the lea ders hip of their tra ditional lead ers , som e of w hom received m ilita ry ed ucation an d train in g in Istanbul; th e 1924 V illa ge A ct; and ® nally the in troduction to the country sid e of a total of 40 000 tra ctors in the 1940s for agr icultura l p urposes, w ith no prior stud y or inquiry Ð contrib uted a lot to the form ation of this picture. T he new Land A ct leg itim iz ed the p osses sion of huge areas of land by the sh eik h s (trib al an d/or relig ious lead ers ). T he chiefs or com m and ers of the H am id iye C avalries, w ho w ere also trib al lead ers, w ere gra nted righ ts to exact taxes, and to m ake use of grazing zones an d h igh land s for their herd s, etc. A nd the V illage A ct turn ed into village com m on p rop erties the tra ditional p astures of nom ad ic and sem i-n om adic trib es of th e reg ion, w ho w ere th us left w ith nothing besid es their herds and tents. A ll these n ot only brought furth er friction and /or hostilities am ong variou s sectors of the p opulation, but also rein forced the trad itional m od e of trib al orga nization in the reg ion.
Th e trib al or ash iret type of social org aniz ation, together w ith the h istorical reasons sketched above, brought a speci® c sen se of in security in south-east A natolia. Th is tra nsla tes into a need for m anpow er, for h e w ho has the m ost m anpow er is considered the strongest an d h en ce th e m ost resp ectable. Th is, in turn , brin gs polygam y (Sen cer, 1992± 93; TK V , 1994; see also G o È kalp, 1975) , as the ea sies t, m ost ef® cien t (plus trad itionally acceptable and religio usly p erm issib le) w ay to have as m any child ren , and as m any allies through m arr iages, as possib le. O ne consequ en ce of this is a high birth ra te, w h ich in turn brin gs a high child m ortality rate, because of insuf® cien t h ealth care (TK V, 1994) , and trad ition al attitud es tow ard s hea lth problem s (su ch as trusting in local tribal eld ers rath er than m edical doctors). Th is lead s to rap id an d en dles s d ivision of la nd am ong sons in every gen eration, on th e one hand, w hich in turn lead s m any p eople to h ave one piece of lan d w hich is good for n oth ing (see Sen cer, 1992± 93, p. 248) . M any of th ese peop le eith er sell th eir la nd and go to th e urb an cen tres w ith no skill for w ork other than cultivation, or beg in to w ork for the la ndlord s w ith little m oney and in kind , in ad d ition to cultivatin g their ow n p lot. Som e of these people w ork as seasonal w ork ers in other reg ions such as the C Ë ukurova basin (O D T U È , 1993) . O n the other han d, it lea ds m an y others to p ractise su ch age-old trad itions as brother' s son/brother' s daughter m arriages for m any gen era tions to com e. These (traditional) efforts to maxim ize the num ber of members of a household, and the ens uing land fragm en tation, lead to landlessn ess of m any people (Sen cer, 1992± 93, p. 246). Furth erm ore, it brin gs severe com petition among people, w hich leads to even high er brid e prices and inability to get married for those w ho lack the necessary economic means and , even tually, to blood feuds.
Scattered resid ence in the m ost secure, inaccessible places (historically , for protection from the Badaw is, for pastoral activities , and due to in ter-ashiret con¯ict) is another res ult, w hich effectively disables efforts to provid e healthcare, education, transportation, etc. It is neither possible nor economically viable to brin g the necessary facilities to those comm unities w hose sizes range from tw o to 10 household s. At presen t, the num ber of these sub-village settlem en ts (called m ezra, kom , etc.) far exceeds the number of villages in the region .
The GAP A dministra tion is curren tly makin g every effort to chang e this picture. A most recen t example of the continued efforts of the G AP Administration is the establishm en t of m ultipurpose C omm unity Cen tres (C Ë ATO M , in Turkish ) both in urban areas and the countrysid e. Th ese centres aim at raising the status of w om en in the region , by training and educating them to gain in come-generating sk ills and providing them w ith necessary information on health issues and child care as w ell as education, sin ce w omen am ong all are the least priv ileged section of society in the reg ion. At presen t, fem ale child ren are not even allow ed to have a decent education as a result of socioeconomic and religiou s reasons, and are m arried at very young ages at`prices' non-affordable by many fam ilies.
Other social projects to be implem ented w ithin the framew ork of G AP include the resettlem en t of those w hose dw ellin g places or ® eld s w ill be in¯uenced by dam lakes (Sosyoloji, 1994) ; reorga nization of the urb an informal sector through education and training for regu lar jobs of m ostly rural origin people w ho¯ood in to the cities w ith few or no sk ills beyon d cultivation; establish ing busing sy stem s for the child ren of the scattered communities; and settlem en t of nom adic people w hose prospect for usin g the south-eastern soil for grazing is approaching zero. Through infrastructural investm ents and implem entation of such social projects, around the year 2005, GAP is estim ated to create employm en t opportunities for about 3 500 000 million people. T h e sam e d ecree con tinues as follow s:
N otes
In the event that they d o n ot ob ey and w ant to go to the h igh land s, the roy al decree is issued for the people of B ehõ snõ , H õ sn-õ M an su Ã r and Go È yn u È k, and for K u È peli H asan an d Ya' kub B eg -og Ï lõ H alil Beg ashirets to b lock the residence centres an d not to allow them to the E lbistan and M alatya territories. (ib id., p. 51; translation by the present author) 6. For several ex am ples of such cases of d isturban ces caused b y nom ads , see U luc Ë ay, 1955, pp. 80ff, 105, 132, 142, 167, 183, 196, 215, etc. 7 . For ex am ple, in the 1840s, the T anzim at governm ent used som e n om adic a sh irets to com plete the 
